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During the past decade, East Asia has made sub-
stantial progress in the areas of regional cooperation 
and integration. In the aftermath of a regional financial 
crisis, which struck East Asia between 1997 and 1998, 
several important regional initiatives were launched. 
Among them, the ASEAN Plus Three Process, the 
Chiang Mai Initiative, and the subsequently convened 
East Asian Summit have all but tied more closely the 
countries in a broadly defined East Asia (MacIntyre et 
al., 2008).
Nevertheless, regional cooperative schemes in 
East Asia are standing in sharp contrast to the Euro-
pean model (Fort and Webber, 2006). Not only are the 
principle of non-interference and the respect of sover-
eignty commonly complied with in the region, but 
these cooperative schemes often fall short of solid 
institutional and legal foundations. It appeared that the 
states in East Asia have been more hesitant than their 
European counterparts to sign binding regional con-
tracts (see Cooley and Spruyt, 2009). However, this is 
not surprising. Since most East Asian countries 
emerged as independent states only after the Second 
World War, state sovereignty remains a politically sen-
sitive issue throughout the region. More importantly, 
regional norms like non-interference and non-use of 
force have sustained the successful development of 
ASEAN (Acharya, 2001). Today, as the regional coop-
erative schemes centred mostly on the initiatives of 
ASEAN, East Asian regionalism is heading for a very 
distinctive path.
There is another important aspect of regional 
cooperation in East Asia. While the societal elites are 
beginning to embrace regionalism in a more concrete 
manner (Pempel, 2005; Shambaugh, 2008), there 
remains considerable scepticism or distrust among the 
peoples of neighbouring countries. Particularly in 
those countries where sovereignty remains a salient 
political issue, politically sensitive events can easily 
ignite public antagonism towards neighbouring coun-
tries, leaving the regional cooperative process at a 
standstill. This, for example, was the case during the 
Chinese demonstration against a Japanese textbook in 
2005, the South Korean naval dispatch to the Dokdo/
Takeshima islets in 2006, Vietnam’s mass protests 
against China in 2007, and the military confrontation 
between Cambodia and Thailand in 2008.
What factors have contributed to the public dis-
trust among certain East Asian countries? In which 
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To promote regional cooperation and integration in East Asia faces a daunting task. Opinion polls constantly 
show that the publics hold deep distrust of one another. The Japanese history textbook demonstration in China and 
the Dokdo/Takeshima demonstration in South Korea, both took place on an unprecedented scale in 2005, show 
how difficult it is to achieve regional reconciliation among ordinary peoples. Using the AsiaBarometer Surveys 
(2003, 2004, 2006) and the Pew Global Survey (2006), our analysis reveals some relevant results concerning pub-
lic perceptions and regional cooperation. First, the public perceptions of neighbouring countries are strongly 
influenced by three key factors: national identity, personal overseas experiences, and trust in national government. 
Second, the more people trust their incumbent government, the more disapproving views they hold towards neigh-
bouring countries. Third, while the incumbent effect is less important in China, it is more prominent in South 
Korea and Japan. These findings not only show the conflicting nature of domestic political support and regional 
reconciliation, but also point to the challenges facing regional cooperation and integration in East Asia.
????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????
Min Shu and Hidetoshi Nakamura
6?????????????? 2?
ways could these factors influence the long-term tra-
jectory of regional cooperation and integration in East 
Asia? This paper addresses these two related questions 
against the background of growing public distrust 
among China, Japan and South Korea. Using the data 
of the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006) and the 
AsiaBarometer Surveys (2003, 2004, 2006), it exam-
ines the public perceptions of neighbouring countries 
among the three most important Northeast Asian coun-
tries. As a major finding, the analysis shows that the 
public perceptions are strongly influenced by three 
key factors: national identity, personal overseas expe-
riences, and the trust in national government. It shows 
that domestic politics and regional reconciliation have 
been intricately linked with each other in East Asia.
The rest of the paper is organised in the following 
way. The second section first takes a close look at the 
theoretical literature on public opinion and regional 
cooperation, most of which has been based on the 
European experiences. It then attempts to contextu-
alise the discussion in East Asia. Four research 
hypotheses applicable to the East Asian context are 
developed. The third section of the paper employs the 
Pew Global and AsiaBarometer Survey data to analyse 
the public perceptions in China, Japan and South 
Korea. The empirical analysis takes two steps. Firstly, 
related survey items are discussed from a cross-coun-
try and cross-time perspective to highlight the 
increasing salience of the problem. Secondly, multi-
variate regression analyses are conducted, using the 
AsiaBarometer Survey in 2006, to test the research 
hypotheses developed earlier. The implications of our 
findings, especially the interaction between domestic 
politics and regional reconciliation, are discussed. The 





After the Second World War, regional cooperation 
and integration flourished in Western Europe, Latin 
America and certain parts of Africa (Fawcett, 1992). 
Based on the early experience of European integra-
tion, the main theorists on regional integration focus 
on the roles of supranational institutions in generating 
‘spill-over effect’ (Haas, 1958) and the ‘low politics’ 
nature of inter-state cooperation (Hoffmann, 1966). 
Neo-functionalism and Intergovernmentalism argue 
against each other, but both agree that European inte-
gration is basically the endeavours made by such elites 
as politicians and technocrats. According to these 
views, ordinary people have very little influence on 
the regional integration process. Although the Trans-
actionalist theorists focus upon an emergence of the 
‘sense of community’ or ‘we-feeling’ among ordinary 
people (Deutsch et al., 1957), the major explanation is 
that, because of their experiences of the atrocity of the 
war, the public have reached a ‘permissive consensus’ 
on regional cooperation and integration. In an article 
published in the early 1970s, Ronald Inglehart argues 
that the future generation would give more support to 
the integration project in Europe (Inglehart, 1971).
However, the trajectory of European integration 
told a different story twenty years later. The new gen-
eration of European Union (EU) citizens have become 
much more sceptical about regional integration. Not 
only do the continuous Eurobarometer surveys show a 
declining trend of public support for the EU 
(McLaren, 2007), but a series of referendums met with 
strong public opposition on the deepening and widen-
ing of the integration project (Shu, 2008). It is against 
the background of growing public dissatisfaction with 
European integration that wide-ranging enquiries into 
the relationship between public opinion and regional 
cooperation began to take shape.
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The early research on public support for regional 
integration stresses the importance of utilitarian con-
cerns . It is argued that people who have the 
opportunity to benefit from the opening of national 
borders are most likely to lend their support for 
regional cooperation and integration (see Gabel, 
1998b). At the individual level, regionalism-enthusi-
asts usually invovle high-skilled labours, people 
working in the exporting sector, individuals who speak 
foreign languages, and those with a higher education. 
Since these people are more adaptive to the trans-bor-
der contacts, they turned out more supportive towards 
regional cooperation and integration than their fellow 
countrymen and women. At the country level, state-
wide indicators such as GDP growth, trade openness, 
inflation rate and unemployment rate are also found 
relevant in the European context. The more a country 
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has economically gained from regional cooperation 
and integration, the more likely that its citizens sup-
port the regional project. Using the Eurobarometer 
surveys conducted in the period leading to the Euro-
pean Single Market, researchers identify strong 
influence of utilitarian concerns on public opinion at 
both the individual and country levels (Eichenberg and 
Dalton, 1993; Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Gabel 
and Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998a).
In the late 1990s, researchers started to examine 
the impacts of political context on public support for 
regional cooperation and integration. In a widely cited 
article, Christopher Anderson argues that most people 
do not have a clear-cut view on regional issues. 
Instead of addressing the survey questions on Euro-
pean integration directly, respondents are more likely 
to employ the proxies of domestic politics to infer 
their attitudes towards regional cooperation (Ander-
son, 1998). Such proxies may involve people’s 
satisfaction with domestic democracy, support for the 
incumbent government, and the trust in mainstream 
parties. His empirical analysis shows that the satisfac-
tion with domestic democracy is a consistent political 
predictor for public opinion on regional cooperation. 
Based on the Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 
1993-1994, one could even find a correlation between 
‘satisfaction with democracy in the EU’ and ‘satisfac-
tion with national democracy’ (Nakamura 2000). 
Indeed, Sanchez-Cuenca finds out that the public atti-
tudes are based on a relative evaluation about the 
functioning of national and EU institutions (Sanchez-
Cuenca, 2000). People who hold more favourable 
views on regional institutions and less favourable 
views on domestic institutions are more likely to be 
positive towards regional integration. Following a 
similar approach, Rohrschneider finds that the public 
support for regional cooperation and region-wide 
institutions depends crucially on the extent to which 
people are pleased with their representation at the 
regional level (Rohrschneider, 2002). Quite impor-
tantly, these studies show that the political context 
takes a strong effect on public opinion independent of 
utilitarian considerations.
The third explanation for public opinion on 
regional integration deals with national identity. 
Regional cooperation and integration challenges and 
transforms the territorial nation-states not just in eco-
nomic and political fields, but also in cultural and 
identificational terms. In two articles appeared in 
2002, Carey (2002) and McLaren (2002) question the 
long-time neglect of national identity in the research 
on public opinion and regional integration. Their anal-
ysis shows that identity variables such as national 
pride, domestic attachment and the fear of cultural and 
identity loss are essential predictors of public opinion 
on regional cooperation. Subsequently, McLaren looks 
further into the threat perceptions of identity loss, and 
manages to integrate the identity variable into the gen-
eral explanation of public opinion on regional 
integration in Europe (McLaren, 2006). Nonetheless, 
identity is more than a single-layer social phenome-
non. National identity often coexists with local, 
regional and cosmopolitan identities (Guibernau, 
2007). In which way does national identity exert the 
most salient influence on public attitudes towards 
regional cooperation and integration? Hooghe and 
Marks (2005) discover that ‘exclusive national iden-
tity’ (that is, people who identify themselves 
exclusively as a member of their own country) plays 
the most important part in contributing to the public 
scepticism towards regional integration. Their findings 
also show that elite division on regional cooperation 
may mobilise and strengthen the impacts of exclusive 
national identity on public opinion.
To summarise, the existing literature on public 
opinion and regional cooperation focuses on three key 
explanatory variables: utilitarian concerns, political 
context and national identity. The argument of utilitar-
ian concerns emphasises the economic costs and 
benefits resulting from regional cooperation and inte-
gration. The perspective of political context stresses 
the mediating effect of domestic politics in informing, 
remoulding and strengthening certain public attitudes 
toward regional cooperation. National identity influ-
ences public opinion in terms of national pride, 
domestic attachment and the threat perceptions of 
identity loss. The more exclusively one identifies with 
her own country, the less supportive her views on 
regional cooperation are. It is worth noting that these 
explanatory variables are not mutually exclusive. 
Under certain circumstances, utilitarian concerns, 
political context and national identity may either rein-
force or counterbalance one another. In Greece, Spain 
and Italy, for example, high level of domestic corrup-
tion boosts public support for regional cooperation 
despite relatively few economic benefits enjoyed by 
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individual citizens (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000). In Brit-
ain, by contrast, the elite disagreement on the country’s 
role in regional integration reinforced the exclusive 
national identity to the detriment of Europhiles 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Therefore, it is essential to 
take a multi-dimensional approach to understanding 
public opinion on regional cooperation.
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However, the existing literature focuses dispro-
port ionally on the experiences of European 
integration. Thanks to the availability of continuous 
Eurobarometer Surveys, these studies uncover impor-
tant mechanisms underlying the relationship between 
public opinion and regional cooperation. Yet, the dis-
tinctiveness of the EU and the regional integration 
process in Europe limits the generalisation of their 
findings.
Firstly, the Single European Market has success-
fully achieved the free movement of goods, capitals, 
labour and service within the EU. As a result, Europe-
ans may easily acquire first-hand experiences 
concerning the costs and benefits of regional coopera-
tion, and develop their views on the EU based on 
utilitarian concerns. Though many other regions have 
pursued regional economic cooperation and integra-
tion in the forms of Free Trade and Investment 
Agreements, it is still difficult for ordinary people to 
understand the economic implications of regional 
cooperation. Secondly, the EU has established several 
sophisticated regional institutions (such as the Euro-
pean Parliament, the European Council, the European 
Commission, and the European Central Bank) capable 
of making binding decisions at the supranational level. 
In Europe, it is safe to talk about an emerging regional 
layer of governance above the member states. This is 
in sharp contrast to other regional institutions where 
binding regional decision-making remains extremely 
rare (Achaya and Johnston, 2007). Under these cir-
cumstances, it is almost impossible for the public to 
compare the relative quality and effectiveness of 
domestic and regional institutions. Thirdly, the ubiqui-
tous EU symbols, including the single currency?the 
Euro, have reinforced the public anxiety over the loss 
of national identity in the EU (Hermann et al., 2004; 
Bruter, 2005). By contrast, regional cooperation rarely 
endangers exclusive national identity in other parts of 
the world. In some countries, national identity may 
even be strengthened through the process of regional 
cooperation and integration (see Sutherland, 2009).
Hence, when applying the theoretical arguments 
on public opinion and regional cooperation, it is essen-
tial to contextualize the discussion in the specific 
regional settings. Regional cooperation and integration 
in East Asia has several distinctive features. First, East 
Asian regionalism is in lack of sophisticated institu-
tional and legal foundations. There exist a number of 
regional forums and frameworks, such as the ASEAN 
Plus Three Process, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the 
Chiang Mai Initiative, the East Asian Summit. None-
theless, the functioning of these regional schemes does 
not rely on institutionalised mechanisms. Instead, their 
effectiveness is based on the informal consensus being 
reached outside the formal meetings of regional lead-
ers (Acharya, 2001). There are no institutionalised 
executives in charge of setting the agenda of regional 
summits. Neither do these forums and frameworks 
have the legal authority to pressure the member states 
into compliance with their decisions.
This leads to the second feature of East Asian 
regionalism: the importance of informal consensus or 
the so-called ‘ASEAN way’. Originated from the prac-
tice of a sub-regional cooperative scheme?the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the ‘ASEAN 
way’ is characterised by ‘a decision-making process 
based on [informal] consultations and consensus’ 
(Acharya, 1997, p. 328). Outside the major meetings 
of regional organisations, East Asian leaders like to 
pay special attention to those informal occasions 
where they could meet and exchange their views on 
regional cooperation. Whether such informal sociali-
sation leads to workable consensus has proved vital in 
reaching a final agreement at the regional level (John-
ston, 2003). Different from the confrontational 
bargaining in an institutionalised setting, regional 
cooperation in East Asia depends crucially on the less-
structured informal consultation process behind the 
public scene.
Moreover, there is another important feature of 
East Asian regionalism: multiple sub-regional cooper-
ative schemes. Within a broadly defined East Asia, 
there are several notable sub-regional forums and 
organisations: ASEAN, the Six-Party Talk, the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organisation, and the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation. Although their 
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key members have all participated in the sixteen-
member East Asian Summit, these organisations cover 
different geographical sub-regions and focus on diver-
sified policy areas. When ASEAN was originally 
launched in the 1960s, it could be regarded as a secu-
rity alliance against China. Nowadays, ASEAN puts 
more efforts on economic integration, aiming to 
become a full-fledged sub-regional community 
(Narine, 2008). The Six-Party Talk focuses on the 
denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. It involves 
four key countries in Northeast Asia as well as two 
extra-regional actors?the US and Russia?in a multi-
lateral framework of sub-regional dialogue (Park, 
2004). Established in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation finds most of its member states in Cen-
tral Asia (Chung, 2004). Initially, its policy agenda 
focused on the cross-border threats of terrorism, sepa-
ratism and extremism. Nowadays, the sub-regional 
cooperation has expanded to economic and cultural 
fields. The South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation is the main sub-regional forum in South 
Asia. Yet, due to the rivalry between India and Paki-
stan, the organisation has not yet achieved substantial 
cooperation beyond the declaration of establishing a 
Free Trade Agreement (Dash, 1996). As a whole, the 
four sub-regional cooperative schemes have created a 
unique layer of sub-regional governance in East Asia.
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The distinctive features of East Asian regionalism 
make it necessary to modify the original theoretical 
arguments derived from the European experiences in 
order to understand the relationship between public 
opinion and regional cooperation in East Asia. In their 
original formulation, the utilitarian concerns of public 
opinion deal both with individual educational, profes-
sional, linguistic backgrounds, and with several 
country-level macroeconomic indicators. Different 
from European integration, regional economic cooper-
ation in East Asia has not yet established a single 
regional market. Most of the regional economic activi-
ties have been oriented towards the global market. 
Regional economic cooperation in the forms of Free 
Trade Agreements is widely perceived as compatible 
with the globalisation process (Aggarwal and Urata, 
2006). Under these circumstances, the connection 
between individual well-being and regional economic 
cooperation appears less tangible than the European 
case. Meanwhile, the macroeconomic indicators of 
East Asian countries have been more closely related to 
the growth of the global market than that of the 
regional market. Hence, although East Asian regional-
ism has made substantial progress in the economic 
areas, it is difficult to identify substantial impact of 
utilitarian concerns on public attitudes toward regional 
cooperation in East Asia.
Hypothesis 1: Utilitarian concerns based on individ-
ual characteristics (such as education and household 
income) do not have a significant impact on public 
opinion on regional cooperation in East Asia.
How, then, does the political context matter to the 
public opinion on regional cooperation in East Asia? 
Before answering this question, there are several 
issues worth considering. First, the political regimes 
vary a lot across East Asian countries. Unlike the EU, 
the political systems in East Asia range from military 
dictatorship and authoritarian governments to instable 
democratic systems and liberal democratic countries. 
It makes little sense to refer to the public satisfaction 
with domestic democracy to infer their views on 
regional cooperation. Second, one of the main features 
of East Asian regionalism is the lack of institutional 
and legal infrastructure at the regional level. Apart 
from the intergovernmental agreements drawn at the 
regional summits, there is little information about the 
operation of various regional cooperative schemes. 
There is no regional representative institution in East 
Asia, either. As a result, the functioning and represen-
tation of regional institutions is not easily detectable 
by the public. Instead of evaluating of the relative 
effectiveness of domestic and regional institutions, it 
is more realistic to expect that ordinary people rely on 
the proxy of domestic politics to develop their views 
on regional cooperation (Anderson, 1998). Third, the 
special ‘ASEAN way’ indicates that informal consul-
tation and consensus among the government officials 
play a crucial part in East Asian regionalism. The 
incumbent governments are standing at the forefront 
of regional cooperation in East Asia. Under these cir-
cumstances, the public trust in the incumbent 
government should be the most important political 




Hypothesis 2: The public trust in the incumbent gov-
ernment plays a central part in remoulding public 
opinion on regional cooperation in East Asia. The 
more one trusts the incumbent government, the more 
likely that she will support for the government’s 
regional cooperative policy.
As far as the role of national identity is con-
cerned, the East Asian experience is not very different 
from the European ones (Shu, 2009). The fear of iden-
tity loss or other forms of exclusive national identity 
clearly work against regional cooperation and integra-
tion. Generally speaking, the more nationalist one 
identified herself, the more likely that she should 
oppose regional cooperation and integration. The 
impact of national identity may even be strengthened 
because of the respect of state sovereignty and the 
principle of non-inference in East Asian regionalism. 
The question, however, is whether national pride, 
domestic attachment, and the fear of identity loss 
operate in the same way on the east side of the Eur-
asian continent. In contrast to the European model, 
regional cooperation in East Asia has not seriously 
endangered the state sovereignty of individual coun-
tries. In some cases, regional cooperation not only is 
regarded as compatible with state sovereignty, but is 
considered to have facilitated the domestic state-build-
ing process (Narine, 2004; Sutherland, 2009). Because 
of such a trend, strong national pride and domestic 
attachment may not necessarily weaken favourable 
attitudes towards regional cooperation in East Asia. As 
Alan Milward describes the early history of European 
integration as the ‘European rescue of the nation-state’ 
(Milward, 1992), East Asia may now be in the similar 
process of making regional integration compatible 
with state sovereignty.
Hypothesis 3: Exclusive national identity weakens 
favourable attitude towards regional cooperation.
Hypothesis 4: If regionalism strengthens state sover-
eignty, national identity becomes compatible with 
public support for regional cooperation in East Asia.
In short, the distinctive features of East Asian 
regionalism make it essential to reconsider the existing 
theoretical arguments about public opinion and 
regional cooperation. In East Asia, the layer of sub-
regional cooperative schemes offers the most tangible 
objective for the public evaluation of regional projects. 
With regard to the roles of utilitarian concerns, politi-
cal context and national identity, additional 
modifications are necessary in order to make them 
applicable to the specific situations in East Asia. Based 
on these research hypotheses, the next section takes a 
close look at the public perceptions of neighbouring 




China, Japan and South Korea stands at a rather 
awkward position in the process of East Asian regional 
cooperation. China is the most populous country in the 
region; Japan has been the largest economy in East 
Asia; South Korea is a recently democratised country 
with a dynamic economy. Despite their complemen-
tary strengths and substantial influences, the three 
countries have so far failed to lead sub-regional, let 
alone regional, cooperation and integration in East 
Asia. There are several reasons behind the lack of sub-
regional initiatives, the most important perhaps being 
the competition between China and Japan. The bitter 
memories of war-time experiences lend no favour to 
the inter-state reconciliation, either. Between 2001 and 
2006, the repeated visits by Koizumi?the Japanese 
Prime Minister?to the Yasukuni Shrine had almost 
frozen the diplomatic relations in Northeast Asia.
If the sub-regional layer of regional governance 
in East Asia offers a good proxy of public opinion on 
regional cooperation, public perceptions of neighbour-
ing countries in China, Japan and South Korea deserve 
careful investigation. In 2005, two large-scale public 
protests against Japan broke out in China and South 
Korea. In the Chinese case, the demonstration was 
against the Japanese government’s approval of a 
school history textbook which downplays the atroci-
ties committed by the Japanese army in the Second 
World War. Self-organised public protests took place 
in the major cities throughout China. In some cases, 
demonstrators attacked Japanese business and official 
consulates, causing damages. In the South Korean 
case, the public were angry about the decision of a 
Japanese prefectural government to set up a memorial 
date for the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima islets. Public 
11
Public Perceptions and Regional Cooperation in East Asia
protests and demonstrations occurred all over the 
country, with some extreme cases like self-immola-
tion. Because of these incidents, the Northeast Asian 
regional cooperation experienced a historically low 
point towards the end of 2005.
Admittedly, it is debatable whether the public 
perceptions of neighbouring countries are equivalent 
to public support for regional cooperation. It is true 
that mutual public perceptions among the neighbour-
ing countries are more related to the bilateral inter-
state relations rather than to multilateral regional 
cooperation. However, Northeast Asia is a special case 
where multilateral regional cooperation has been long 
delayed by the still-to-be-improved bilateral relation-
ships among China, Japan and South Korea (Rozman, 
2004). Without dealing with the bilateral distrust 
among China, Japan and South Korea, it is simply 
impossible to conceive any substantial progress of 
regional cooperation in both Northeast and East Asia. 
Because of this, the Sino-Japanese relations and the 
Japanese-Korean relations have almost become syn-
onyms of region cooperation in Northeast Asia. Using 
the public perceptions of neighbouring countries as a 
proxy, the following empirical analysis attempts to 
identify the potential factors which influence sub-
regional and regional cooperation in East Asia.
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Between March and April 2006, the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project conducted public opinion polls in 
China and Japan. The China survey was conducted in 
April, with a sample size of 2180; The Japan survey 
was fielded between March and April, with a sample 
size of 500. Both ask the respondents whether they 
‘have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, some-
what unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of’ 
their own country and of each other. The results show 
quite similar trends in the two countries. Whereas 71% 
of the Chinese respondents hold unfavourable views 
about Japan, 70% of the Japanese respondents turned 
out to be negative towards China (see Table 1). As the 
Chinese protests in 2005 was triggered by a history 
textbook, it is essential to examine the public opinion 
on war history. The Pew Global surveys also asked the 
respondents to evaluate whether Japan has made suffi-
cient apology for the war and whether they support 
Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. The answers 
could not be more different between the two countries. 
More than 80% of the respondents in China believe 
that Japan has not made sufficient apology for the war; 
the corresponding figure in Japan is 44% (see Figure 
1). Regarding Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, 
over half (52%) of the Japanese respondents support 
his visit; 78% of the Chinese respondents oppose the 
visit (see Figure 2). No doubt, the memory of the war 
still deeply divides the public opinion in China and 
Japan.
However, the China sample of the Pew Global 
Project was disproportionally urban. It relies on a 
probability sample in six Chinese cities (Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xinxiang, Jinzhong and 
Luzhou) and their surrounding areas only; The Japan 
sample, on the other hand, was based on telephone 
households (PewResearchCenter, 2006). Considering 
the anti-Japanese protests occurred mostly in urban 
China, the results could bias towards unfavourable 
views on Japan. Moreover, the Chinese and South 
Korean protests in 2005 might have exacerbated the 
public perceptions of Japan. Therefore, it is essential 
to look into another series of cross-country opinion 
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China Japan
China survey Very favorable 58% Very favorable 3%
Somewhat favorable 36% Somewhat favorable 25%
Somewhat unfavorable 4% Somewhat unfavorable 49%
Very unfavorable 1% Very unfavorable 22%
Japanese survey Very favorable 2% Very favorable 27%
Somewhat favorable 19% Somewhat favorable 50%
Somewhat unfavorable 41% Somewhat unfavorable 20%
Very unfavorable 29% Very unfavorable 2%
Note: The survey question reads ‘Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, 
somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of [the following country]’.
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polls to cross-validate the results of Pew Global Proj-
ect.
The AsiaBarometer surveys, directed by Prof. 
Inoguchi, offer a useful comparison in this regard. 
Between 2003 and 2008, the AsiaBarometer has con-
ducted public opinion surveys in a number of Asian 
countries. Japan, China and South Korea were among 
the survey countries in 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2008. As 
the 2008 surveys have not been released, our analysis 
focuses on the previous three rounds of poll results. In 
the AsiaBarometer Surveys, the respondents were 
asked to evaluate whether a certain country has a good 
or bad influence on their own country. The original 
survey questions offer five alternatives to the respon-
dents: ‘good influence, rather good influence, neither 
good nor bad influence, rather bad influence, and bad 
influence’. In contrast to the Pew Global Project, the 
inclusion of a neutral answer?‘neither good nor bad 
influence’?makes it very difficult to compare the 
results of the two surveys. In order to minimise the 
problem, the five alternatives are collapsed into three 
categories (i.e., good influence, neutral influence and 
bad influence) in the aggregate results reported in 
Table 2. Even so, these results should be treated with 
cautions.
The data indicate that Chinese people do hold 
quite negative views on Japan in 2006: 61.3% of the 
respondents think that Japan had a bad influence on 
China. The anti-Chinese sentiment among the Japa-
nese respondents is relatively muted in the same year: 
37.8% of the respondents believe that China had a bad 
influence on Japan. The inclusion of survey results in 
2003 and 2004 reveals a dynamic picture of mutual 


































Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006
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Chinese protests against Japan, only about 40% of 
Chinese respondents perceived the bad influence of 
Japan. The equivalent figure in Japan is around 20%. 
Obviously, the protests have had a substantial impact 
on public perceptions.
Because of the inclusion of South Korea in the 
AsiaBarometer Surveys, it is also possible to check the 
Korea-Japan public perceptions. The aggregate survey 
data reveal that the Korea-Japan mutual perceptions in 
2006 are not very different from the distrust between 
China and Japan. As Table 2 shows, 58.3% of the 
Korean respondents feel negative towards the Japanese 
influence, while 31.6% of the Japanese respondents 
are unhappy with South Korea. In 2004, the corre-
sponding figures were only 30.7% in South Korea and 
11.2% in Japan. The impacts of South Korean protests 
appeared even stronger than the Chinese ones.
By comparison, the mutual perceptions between 
China and South Korea are more positive. About half 
of the Chinese respondents think positively towards 
South Korea. Only around 5% of the respondents feel 
South Korea had a bad influence on China. In South 
Korea, the positive-view holders are almost always 10 
to 15% more than the negative-view holders. Com-
pared with the bilateral perceptions between China 
and Japan and between Japan and South Korea, the 
China-Korean figures are much more stable over the 
three surveying years.
?????????????????????????????????
In order to understand the determinants of public 
perceptions in China, Japan and South Korea, it is 
necessary to conduct in-depth multivariate regression 
analysis. The ideal solution would be a comparative 
analysis of the three waves of AsiaBarometer surveys 
in 2003, 2004 and 2006. However, the AsiaBarometer 
surveys in 2003 and 2004 do not have a representative 
sample in China. The sample sizes were smaller (800 
in 2003 and 1000 in 2004), and the respondents were 
drawn mostly from big cities (Inoguchi et al., 2005; 
Inoguchi et al., 2006).
The AsiaBarometer survey in 2006, by compari-
?????????????????????????????????????????????
China’s Perceptions of Neighbouring Countries
2003 2004 2006
Japan good 29.7% 21.2% 7.5%
neutral 30.4% 35.1% 29.4%
bad 39.8% 39.0% 61.3%
South Korea good 44.5% 40.3% 53.2%
neutral 50.1% 45.4% 40.0%
bad 5.4% 5.1% 4.4%
Japan’s Perceptions of Neighbouring Countries
2003 2004 2006
China good 23.3% 23.0% 20.6%
neutral 56.4% 46.4% 37.2%
bad 18.2% 23.6% 37.8%
South Korea good 24.7% 37.0% 23.6%
neutral 42.1% 46.1% 40.2%
bad 31.6% 11.2% 31.6%
South Korea’s Perceptions of Neighbouring Countries
2003 2004 2006
China good 33.9% 43.4% 35.6%
neutral 44.4% 28.3% 35.5%
bad 18.8% 24.3% 26.5%
Japan good 25.3% 33.9% 16.0%
neutral 42.4% 32.1% 24.7%
bad 29.9% 30.7% 58.3%
Note: the survey question reads, ‘Do you think that the following countries have a good or bad 
influence on your country?’
14
?????????????? 2?
son, offers a much more balanced cross-country 
opinion poll. Its fieldwork was conducted in the sum-
mer of 2006 in a number of East Asian countries, 
including China, Japan and South Korea. Its China 
sample not only involved 2,000 respondents, but relied 
on a three-stage sampling technique covering the total 
population (Guo and Shu, 2009). Its Japan sample had 
1003 valid respondents who were drawn from a four-
stage nationwide sampling procedures. The South 
Korean sample drew 1000 respondents following a 
six-stage sampling procedures. To take advantage of 
these high-quality cross-country surveys, our multi-
variate analysis focuses on the AsiaBarometer survey 
in 2006.
As it is mentioned earlier, the survey asked each 
respondent to rate his/her perceptions of a neighbour-
ing country based on a five-alternative choice. 
Because these alternatives can be ranked from the 
most favourable to the least favourable, the dependent 
variable of the regression is discreetly ordinal. A suit-
able econometric model to tackle it is ordinal logistic 
regression (Long, 1997). The multivariate analysis 
uses the original five-category answer to the survey 
question, to take advantage of all information provided 
by the dataset. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if 
the respondent perceives a good influence of a neigh-
bouring country, and coded as 5 if she perceives a bad 
influence.
Based on the research hypotheses developed in 
the earlier section, four groups of explanatory vari-
ables are included in the regression analysis. Firstly, to 
test the relevance of utilitarian concerns, four individ-
ual characteristic variables are used to check the 
impacts of age, gender, educational level and house-
hold income on the public perceptions of neighbouring 
countries. From a utilitarian perspective, those who 
tend to benefit from transnational activities are more 
likely to support regional cooperation and integration. 
Therefore, it is expected that a typical young male 
with more education and higher household income 
have better views on other counties and support 
regional cooperation. These individual variables also 
provide the demographic controls of the sample.
Secondly, the analysis uses the survey question 
about ‘trust in national government’ to identify the 
impact of political context on public perceptions in the 
three Northeast Asian countries. The original survey 
question reads, ‘Please indicate to what extent you 
trust the central government to operate in the best 
interests of society’. The respondent may choose her 
answer among ‘trust a lot’, ‘trust to a degree’, ‘don’t 
really trust’, and ‘don’t trust at all’. As most regional 
cooperative schemes in East Asia are more intergov-
ernmental than supranational, it is expected that the 
more one trust her national government, the more 
likely she would hold better views on neighbouring 
countries and support regional cooperation.
Thirdly, regarding the role of national identity, the 
analysis uses three explanatory variables to measure 
the underlying dimensions of national identity in East 
Asia. The first variable is national pride, with four dif-
ferent options from ‘very proud’ to ‘not proud at all’. 
The second variable deals with cultural superiority. 
The survey question states, ‘my country’s traditional 
culture is superior to that of other country’. The 
respondent may choose between five answers ranging 
from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. The third 
variable concerns patriotic education, something spe-
cific to China and Japan. The survey asked the 
respondent whether she agrees with the statement that 
‘government should emphasize patriotic education to 
breed patriotism’ with a similar five-category answer.
Fourthly, the regression analysis includes several 
variables concerning overseas connections or experi-
ences of the survey respondents. These variables 
include ‘overseas family members’, ‘travelled abroad 
more than 3 times’, ‘overseas friend(s)’, ‘watching 
foreign TV programs’, ‘internet communication with 
foreigners’ and ‘job contacts with foreigners’. The aim 
is to check whether personal experiences with foreign-
ers or foreign countries help to reshape the perceptions 
of neighbouring countries. According to the Transac-
tionalist theories, such experiences can become very 
important in promoting regional cooperation and inte-
gration (see Deutsch et al., 1957). These variables help 
to test whether this argument is applicable to East 
Asia. Finally, the two variables of ‘trust in others’ and 
‘local variations’ are used to control unobserved indi-
vidual characteristics.
Overall, the regression model takes the following 
form:
Pi = ? + Utilitariani? + Politicali? + Identityi? 
+ Overseasi? + ei
In this equation, Pi denotes the dependent variable 
‘public perceptions of a certain neighbouring country’; 
? is the intercept; ?, ?, ? and ? are the coeffi-
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cients of the independent variables that the analysis 
intends to focus on; ei is the error term. With regard to 
the four groups of independent variables, Utilitariani 
represents the explanatory variables which record the 
individual characteristics of the respondent (i.e., age, 
gender, education and income); Politicali is the explan-
atory variable of ‘trust in national government’; 
Identityi denotes the three explanatory variables of 
‘national pride’, ‘cultural superiority’ and ‘patriotic 
education’; Overseasi represents the explanatory vari-
ables concerning the overseas experiences and 
contacts of the respondent. Two controlling vari-
ables?‘trust in others’ and ‘local variations’?are not 
included in this equation.
The descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
independent variables are reported in the Appendix 
(Table 1, 2 and 3).
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In total, six ordinal logistic regressions are con-
ducted with regard to the public perceptions of 
neighbouring states in China, Japan and South Korea.
Due to the inclusion of multiple explanatory vari-
ables in each thematic category (e.g., overseas 
connections, nationalist feelings), it is possible that 
these regressions suffer from multicollinarity. To 
check it, we calculate the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) of each independent variable regarding the 
China, Japan and South Korea samples (Mansfield and 
Helms, 1982). The results are reported in the Appen-
dix (Table 4). Under normal circumstances, if a 
regression model has the problem of multicollinarity, 
individual VIFs usually appear greater than 10 and the 
average VIF should be greater than 6 (O’Brien, 2007). 
In our regression models, none of the individual VIFs 
is greater than 1.5. The mean VIF for the China, Japan 
and South Korea samples are 1.12, 1.17, and 1.21 
respectively. Thus, the analysis shows that multicolli-
narity is not an issue of concern here.
The outcomes of the six ordinal logistic regres-
sions are reported in Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5. 
Compared with the gloomy picture of the aggregate 
data, the regression analysis leads to some encourag-
ing findings and reveals several important mechanisms 
underlying the public perceptions in the three North-
east Asian countries.
As far as utilitarian concerns are concerned, the 
four variables of individual characteristics have not 
provided consistent evidence for the theoretical argu-
ments originated from the European context. In China, 
gender, age, education and household income all 
appear relevant to the public perceptions of neighbour-
ing countries. Specifically, a typical young female 
with less education appears more favourable towards 
Japan, while a typical young male with higher educa-
tion and low household income appears more 
favourable toward South Korea. In particular, gender 
and age play quite an important role in shaping public 
perceptions in China. Females are more likely than 
males to hold a positive opinion on Japan. The young 
generation tends to possess more positive views on 
neighbouring countries than the old generation. In 
Japan, the only significant individual characteristic is 
age: the younger the respondent is, the more favour-
ably she thinks about China and South Korea. In South 
Korea, individual backgrounds do not exert significant 
influences on public perceptions.
From a utilitarian perspective, more education 
and higher household income should be positively cor-
related with favourable public perceptions of 
neighbouring countries. However, the regressions have 
not provided consistent and meaningful results as to 
the influences of utilitarian concerns in shaping public 
perceptions across China, Japan and South Korea. The 
educational level and household income are only rele-
vant in the Chinese public perceptions of South Korea. 
Even in this case, the direction of the influences is not 
consistent. Yet, the lack of conclusive findings con-
firms the first research hypothesis that ‘utilitarian 
concerns in terms of individual characteristics do not 
have a significant impact on public opinion on 
regional cooperation in East Asia’ (see also Jhee, 
2009).
In contrast to the lack of evidence regarding utili-
tarian concerns, the role of political context in terms 
of ‘trust in national government’ turns out to be a cru-
cial factor in explaining public perceptions in 
Northeast Asia. Across China, Japan and South Korea, 
‘trust in national government’ appears consistently to 
the detriments of favourable attitudes towards neigh-
bouring countries. The more one trust her national 
government, the more likely she perceives a negative 
influence of neighbouring countries. The coefficients 
of the political context variable are statistically signifi-
cant in all three cases, but their sizes vary to some 




Dependent Variable Public Perceptions of 
Japan
Public Perceptions of 
South Korea
Domestic politics










































































-2 log likelihood 4801.939 4002.091
Model improvement
(chi-square, df = 17)
101.041*** 91.215***
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 0.056 0.053
Standard errors in parenthesis; * denotes p < 0.05; ** denotes p < 0.01; *** denotes p < 0.001
Source: AsiaBarometer Surveys 2006
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Dependent Variable Public Perceptions of 
China
Public Perceptions of 
South Korea
Domestic politics






















































































-2 log likelihood 1811.205 1722.469
Model improvement
(chi-square, df = 20)
42.511** 67.871***
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 0.066 0.104
Standard errors in parenthesis; * denotes p < 0.05; ** denotes p < 0.01; *** denotes p < 0.001























































































-2 log likelihood 2262.045 2376.416
Model improvement(chi-square, df = 18) 53.147*** 95.414***
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 0.063 0.108
Standard errors in parenthesis; * denotes p < 0.05; ** denotes p < 0.01; *** denotes p < 0.001
Source: AsiaBarometer Surveys 2006
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‘trust in national government’ is least capable of 
remoulding the Chinese attitudes towards Japan. On 
the other hand, ‘trust in national government’ appears 
most influential in shaping the Japanese perceptions of 
South Korea. Among the three countries, South Kore-
ans are most likely to refer to their ‘trust in national 
government’ when assessing the influence of a neigh-
bouring country.
The analysis thus confirms the second analytical 
hypothesis that ‘the public trust in the incumbent gov-
ernment plays a central part in remoulding public 
opinion on regional cooperation in East Asia’. How-
ever, the direction of the influence is the opposite of 
our original expectation. Since regional cooperation in 
Northeast and East Asia has been lack of supranational 
engineering, it was initially hypothesised that ‘trust in 
national government’ would lead to favourable opin-
ions on neighbouring countries. Nonetheless, the 
regression analysis shows that ‘trust in national gov-
ernment’ actually reduces the positive images of 
neighbouring countries. Such a puzzling relationship 
between domestic politics and regional reconciliation 
deserves further discussion.
In the existing literature, it is argued that the pub-
lic refer to their trusted political actors such as the 
incumbent government or a political party for heuristic 
cues on regional cooperation and integration (Ander-
sen, 1998). If the government favours regional 
cooperation, their supporters are more likely to adopt 
a similar opinion on regional issues. Importantly, there 
are two underlying assumptions of this argument. 
First, the government has a clear-cut policy on 
regional cooperation. Second, the information process 
operates in a one-way direction from the government 
to the public. However, these two assumptions may 
misrepresent the reality in East Asia. Among China, 
Japan and South Korea, there is no agreed roadmap of 
regional cooperation and integration. It is difficult to 
tell the concrete regional cooperation policies of the 
Chinese, Japanese and South Korean governments. At 
the same time, the public seems to have some deep-
seated opinions on neighbouring countries. The anti-
Japanese feelings have been widespread in China and 
South Korea for quite a long time. Because of these 
factors, the two assumptions mentioned above fail to 
hold. Rather than the government cuing the public, it 
is more plausible to assume that the governments in 
Northeast Asia also respond to the public distrust of 
neighbouring country in order to win their political 
support. In other words, the information process may 
operate in a two-way fashion between the pubic and 
the government.
If this is the case, the results of the regression 
analysis have revealed a more complex picture of the 
impacts of political context on the public attitudes 
towards neighbouring countries. A relatively small 
coefficient of ‘trust in national government’ not just 
indicate that the government is less capable of influ-
encing the public opinion on neighbouring countries, 
but also reflect the fact that the government is less able 
to profit from the public distrust to boost its own pop-
ularity in domestic politics. Interpreting in such a way, 
it appears that presenting negative images of neigh-
bouring counties benefits the Chinese government the 
least among the three Northeast Asian countries. By 
comparison, the South Korean government may bene-
fit the most from promoting the negative feelings of 
neighbouring counties. Some commentators have 
argued that the Chinese government tends to use anti-
Japanese sentiment to bolster its domestic credentials 
(e.g., Fukuyama, 2005, p. 84). The regression analysis 
tells a much more nuanced story in this regard.
With regard to the impact of national identity, the 
multivariate regression has not offered an unequivocal 
answer to the hypotheses. Firstly, national pride does 
not influence the public perceptions of neighbouring 
countries in a significant way. The direction of the 
influence, if any, appears to be context-based. Only in 
South Korea, national pride leads to more negative 
images of neighbouring countries in a consistent but 
insignificant manner. Secondly, cultural superiority is 
a significant predictor of public perceptions in China, 
but it is only applicable to the Chinese perceptions of 
Japan. The more the respondent feels the superiority 
of Chinese culture, the more likely that she holds a 
negative opinion on Japan. In all other cases, cultural 
superiority does not significantly influence public per-
ceptions.
Thirdly, support for patriotic education is a sig-
nificant determinant of public attitudes between China 
and Japan. As it is mentioned earlier, patriotic educa-
tion was a political issue in China and Japan, but not 
in South Korea. On the one hand, China implemented 
a wide-ranging patriotic education programme from 
the beginning of the 1990s. On the other hand, 
whether patriotic education should be written into the 
20
?????????????? 2?
Basic Law of Education has been hotly debated in 
Japan. The regression analysis shows that the Chinese 
and Japanese respondents are indeed more likely to 
hold a negative image of each other if they feel the 
necessity of patriotic education. Notably, the size of its 
influence is the highest among the three national iden-
tity variables. If the support for patriotic education 
offers certain clue to one’s exclusive national identity, 
then the results give partial support to the third 
research hypothesis that ‘exclusive national identity 
weakens favourable attitude towards regional coopera-
tion’. The fourth hypothesis states that ‘when 
regionalism strengthens state sovereignty, national 
identity becomes compatible with public support for 
regional cooperation in East Asia’. Unfortunately, the 
regression analysis has not offered a conclusive proof 
in this respect.
Looking as a whole, the analysis shows that 
nationalist feelings per se have not strongly influenced 
the public perceptions of neighbouring countries 
among China, Japan and South Korea. In relative 
terms, the influences of national identity on public 
perceptions are stronger in China, and weaker in South 
Korea. This is in contrast to the images of radical 
nationalism one often finds in the news articles about 
the anti-Japanese demonstrations took place in China 
and South Korea in 2005. It is probable that radical 
nationalism did influence public opinion to some 
degrees in these two countries, but apparently nation-
alism itself could not fully explain the extensive 
mobilisation of negative attitudes.
Concerning the role of overseas experiences and 
connections, the regression analysis shows some inter-
esting but still ambivalent results. In China, the image 
of Japan is positively correlated with overseas family 
members and recent overseas trip, but is negatively 
correlated with the experience of watching foreign TV 
programs. In addition, the Internet communication 
with foreigners contributes to a positive image of 
South Korea. In South Korea, watching foreign TV 
programs is positively correlated with the respondent’s 
perceptions of Japan, but is negatively correlated with 
her perceptions of China. Meanwhile, jobs contacts 
with foreigners may help the Koreans to develop a 
favourable view of China. In the Japanese case, over-
seas experiences and connections appear almost 
irrelevant to public perceptions of neighbouring coun-
tries. As a whole, the analysis indicates that overseas 
experiences and connections exert an important, but 
not consistent, influence on public opinion.
Finally, with respect to the two controlling vari-
ables, ‘trust in others’ is consistently correlated with a 
positive image of neighbouring countries, but it is only 
statistically significant in the cases of Chinese and 
South Korean perceptions of Japan. The ‘local varia-
tion’ variable also turns out to be informative. In 
China, the respondents who live in the Eastern prov-
inces are more likely to hold a positive image of 
Japan. In South Korea, people live around the Seoul 
metropolitan area are more inclined to cultivate the 
negative images of China and Japan, while those live 
in the Southeast are more likely to hold a positive 
image of Japan. In Japan, those who live in the Kinki 
area tend to hold a relatively negative view on China 
and South Korea.
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This paper has examined the public perceptions 
of neighbouring countries in China, Japan and South 
Korea against a broad trend of the growing enthusiasm 
for regional cooperation and integration in East Asia. 
The aim is to understand which factors have contrib-
uted to the public distrust of neighbouring countries, 
and to find out how these factors may influence the 
long-term trajectory of regional cooperation in East 
Asia. To achieve these aims, the paper first tries to 
re-interpret the existing theoretical arguments about 
public opinion and regional cooperation in the East 
Asian context. Then, based on the revised research 
hypotheses, a series of empirical analysis have been 
conducted with regard to the public attitudes towards 
neighbouring countries in China, Japan and South 
Korea at both aggregate and individual levels.
The empirical analysis has led to several impor-
tant findings. First of all, the public opinion at the 
aggregate level reveals a high degree of public distrust 
among China, Japan and South Korea in 2006. The 
two cross-country opinion surveys?the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project and the AsiaBarometer Surveys?
have shown a similar result. This is not surprising. In 
2005 both China and South Korea witnessed large-
scale public protests and demonstrations against Japan. 
Compared with the poll results in 2003 and 2004, the 
aggregate results indicate that these protests have seri-
ously deteriorated the public views on neighbouring 
countries.
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Nevertheless, the individual-level regression 
analysis has revealed a more nuanced picture. Firstly, 
national identity plays a relatively weak role in con-
tributing to the negative images of neighbouring 
countries. Across China, Japan and South Korea, 
national pride does not significantly influence public 
perceptions at all. It is only the feelings of cultural 
superiority and the support for patriotic education that 
lead to a heightened distrust between China and Japan. 
Quite similar to the European case (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2005), exclusive national identity appears to 
discourage inter-state trust and regional cooperation. 
Secondly, like their counterparts in Europe (Andersen 
1998; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000), people in East Asia 
tend to rely on domestic politics to infer their views on 
regional issues. The analysis shows that trust in 
national government encourage negative views on 
neighbouring countries in all the three Northeast Asian 
countries. The impact of political context matters the 
most in South Korea, and the least in China.
Although public distrust among the three North-
east Asian countries turns out to be a joint ‘product’ of 
national identity and domestic politics, political con-
text appears more influential than national identity in 
relative terms. This is important because it means that 
domestic politics and regional reconciliation are linked 
with each other in an intricate way in Northeast Asia. 
The governments may play an important part in 
reversing the trend of growing public distrust. The 
individual-level analysis shows that the mobilisation 
effects of the national government vary across China, 
Japan and South Korea. While the South Korean gov-
ernment can play quite a large role in reshaping the 
Korean opinion, the Chinese government is less com-
petent to change the deep-seated distrust among its 
people.
When it comes to the impacts of utilitarian con-
cerns and overseas experiences, the picture is less 
clear than the European case. Neither do the individual 
characteristics like education and household income 
play a significant part in shaping the public percep-
tions of neighbouring countries, nor have the overseas 
experiences of the respondents exerted a consistent 
influence on public opinion. This leads to one of the 
key arguments of our paper. That is, the distinctive 
features of East Asian regionalism make it difficult to 
apply the existing theoretical arguments originally 
developed from the experiences of European integra-
tion. Indeed, the importance of sub-regional 
cooperation, the respect of state sovereignty, the lack 
of institutional and legal foundations have all led to a 
distinctive regional context where public opinions are 
formed, reshaped and mobilised. It is therefore essen-
tial to reconsider the existing theories in light of the 
special regional context. This paper has made a contri-
bution in this respect by developing the analytical 
hypotheses directly applicable to East Asia.
However, our paper has a notable limitation. The 
empirical analysis looks only into the public percep-
tions of neighbouring countries in Northeast Asia. 
While empirically important and theoretically rele-
vant, the analysis has not provided direct evidence of 
the relationship between public opinion and regional 
cooperation in East Asia. Future research may further 
develop the analytical hypotheses and test them with 
the opinion data on East Asian regionalism.
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Average Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum








Trust in National Gov. 1.76 0.777 1
(trust a lot)
4
(don’t trust at all)
National pride 1.63 0.776 1
(very proud)
4
(not proud at all)
























































Source: The China sample of the AsiaBarometer Survey (N=2000).
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Average Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum








Trust in National Gov. 2.66 0.707 1
(trust a lot)
4
(don’t trust at all)
National pride 1.88 0.754 1
(very proud)
4
(not proud at all)




























































Average Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum








Trust in National Gov. 3.05 0.693 1
(trust a lot)
4
(don’t trust at all)
National pride 1.95 0.674 1
(very proud)
4
(not proud at all)

























































Source: The South Korea sample of the AsiaBarometer Survey (N=1000).
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China Sample Japan Sample South Korea Sample
VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance
Domestic politics
Trust in national government 1.03 0.9705 1.08 0.9276 1.06 0.9437
Nationalist feelings
National pride 1.06 0.9443 1.13 0.8867 1.13 0.8874
National culture is superior 1.14 0.8764 1.14 0.8790 1.27 0.7872
Patriotic education is necessary 1.13 0.8866 1.15 0.8698 1.25 0.7970
Individual Characteristics
Gender 1.01 0.9855 1.06 0.9416 1.05 0.9502
Age 1.14 0.8788 1.15 0.8698 1.48 0.6745
Education 1.36 0.7335 1.24 0.8053 1.71 0.5857
Household income 1.27 0.7859 1.22 0.8180 1.13 0.8835
Overseas connections
Overseas family members 1.11 0.9035 1.14 0.8790 1.08 0.9283
Travelled abroad more than 3 times 1.08 0.9277 1.22 0.8188 1.22 0.8167
Overseas friend(s) 1.09 0.9181 1.16 0.8609 1.13 0.8830
Watching foreign TV programs 1.07 0.9375 1.14 0.8773 1.08 0.9280
Internet communication with foreigners 1.13 0.8853 1.43 0.7005 1.30 0.7710
Job contacts with foreigners 1.11 0.9038 1.30 0.7697 1.33 0.7500
Social capital
Most people can be trusted 1.06 0.9437 1.07 0.9343 1.05 0.9502
Intra-national variation
Local dummies 1.08 0.9236 1.03 0.9746 1.10 0.9092
Mean VIF 1.12 1.17 1.21
